

Declassified and
Approved for Release
July 2000

TITLE: C/TFR - Chile Task Force Reports (16959-17057)

1066

DATE:

ACTION:

REMARKS:

C - Continuing
STATUS:

September

- 4 Presidential elections held in Chile.
Memo Chile/Perspects for Political Action...
8 Sept. [REDACTED]
- 11 Initial Agency prop guidance issued.
- 14 40 Committee approves covert action operation in support of constitutional approach to denying Allende the presidency. [REDACTED] contingency fund requested by Ambassador authorized for this operation [REDACTED]
- 15 A schedule of influencing actions is begun, using prominent persons, and political and church groups.
- 16 [REDACTED] operation approved.
- Prop guidance cable sent to [REDACTED] requesting press exploitation of Chilean situation. [REDACTED]
- 17 Headquarters task force(s) organized and initial staff assigned.
- [REDACTED] Prop guidance cable [REDACTED] requesting immediate support for El Mercurio's fight to defeat Allende and exploitation of reports that Communists are attempting to gain control of all media. [REDACTED]
- Agency staff officers canvassed to determine residual access to [REDACTED] military officers in Chile. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- UP candidate Salvador Allende wins 40,000 vote plurality of approximately 3 million votes cast; Alessandri (PN) finished second and Tomic (PDC) third.
- First station placements appeared in Hemisphere press.
- Purpose of the operation is to assist attempts by [REDACTED] the PDC to develop sufficient support to elect Alessandri in 24 October congressional run-off. Alessandri stated he would resign immediately to allow new elections in which Frei could be a candidate.
- Agency-instigated declarations of support and sympathy to Frei, or actions to negate Allende supporters will be a constant in this program.
- [REDACTED] operation intended to make maximum effort by all possible means to deny Allende the presidency.
- Propaganda generated is intended to create atmosphere of hope that an alternative to Marxist government in Chile will be found.
- [REDACTED] operation to function at Headquarters under general cover of 40 Committee approval of 14 September for political action.
- Station requested [REDACTED] support in an effort to create greater awareness of El Mercurio's almost single-handed effort to prevent the establishment of a Marxist government in Chile, and to resist the Communist anti-media campaign.
- All possible contacts with Chilean military being exploited to determine economic and other vulnerabilities of Allende forces.

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transmitting text of New York
editorial on Chile and urging replay.

The Washington Post replayed the IAPA
item.

extract pledges from an Allende government which would
be under discipline of a Moscow-line Communist Party.

The IAPA statement and subsequent replay is expected
to have a significant impact in Latin American press
circles and should attract additional public opinion.

Access to radio broadcasting facilities becomes more
important in view of possibility all Chilean outlets
threaten to dry up soon under intensive anti-media
campaign of the Communists.

General Schneider is reportedly key figure. His coopera-
tion, approval and participation in any coup attempt is
critical. However, he is apparently reluctant to move
without a direct order from Frei.

SECRET

Chief of Station established indirect contact with various Chilean military leaders [REDACTED]

Chief of Station encouraged support military efforts to organize a coup [REDACTED]

18

[REDACTED] debriefed by Agency representatives. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Correspondents from [REDACTED] newspapers and news services being sent to Santiago for on-the-site coverage of this situation. [REDACTED]

19

[REDACTED] A statement was released to the press in the name of the IAPA protesting Communist efforts to muzzle the free press [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Reports [REDACTED] indicate that some military leaders are discussing a possible coup attempt calling for: resignation of Cabinet; appointment of military cabinet; appointment by Frei of acting president and Frei's departure.

The Station takes a significant step.

We have been working closely with [REDACTED] to identify possible leads in the military, economic pressure points, and other vulnerabilities.

This action is part of a continuing effort to determine areas of weakness within the Allende forces and possible means of exploiting them, in this case, externally.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We expect these correspondents will develop materials for publication in their respective papers focusing the attention of other Latin American countries on the Chilean problem.

This statement generated hemisphere press coverage on the developments in Chile. [REDACTED]

The exact nature of the 22 September event while unspecified may be related to military coup planning.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] carried article incorporating initial prop guidance from Santiago regarding anti-media campaign of the Communists.

[REDACTED]

Santiago Station sent major prop guidance instructions [REDACTED] reiterating themes for external exploitation of Chilean situation.

[REDACTED]

A major Sao Paulo newspaper carried an article on 20 September replaying the New York Times editorial on Chile of 19 September.

[REDACTED]

The IAPA news release was carried in part or in full in 20-21 September editions of following newspapers: Miami Herald; El Telegrafo, Guayaquil; Panama American and Matutino, Panama City; La Prensa, Buenos Aires; Ultima Hora, Santo Domingo. In addition, item also broadcast over local Panama City radio 19 and 21 September.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A Chilean [REDACTED] was debriefed on 18 September regarding the situation within [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This coverage was generated in response to continuing prop requirement to focus greater attention on Communists' efforts to control media.

Besides summarizing already identified themes for prop exploitation Station guidance calls for intensification of this effort as capability in Santiago decreases. It also asks [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Headquarters clarified [REDACTED] operation for
COS Santiago [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] explained nature
of compartmentation within U. S. Govern-
ment.

Major "B" message sent to COS Santiago
requesting detailed outline of course of
actions being considered by Station in
carrying out strictly military solution
to Chilean problem.

Editorials of four San Salvador dailies
continue to comment on dangers of Com-
munist Chile in Latin America. Official
PDC silence broken, however, by PDC Gen
Secy and PDC guest columnist who defend
PDC-Chile and blame Alessandristas for
present difficulties.

La Prensa of Buenos Aires featured spe-
cial article 20 September dealing with
Chilean elections which pointed out that
Communist regime about to be installed
in Chile, although two thirds of voters
were opposed to Marxist candidate Allende.

Prestigious Lima daily La Prensa carries
slashing attack of PDC-Chile for preparing
way for Communist take over in Chile.
Article personally indicts Frei and For-
eign Minister Valdes.

[REDACTED]

This message intended to: (a) crystalize Headquarters
and Station thinking on best ways to bring about ob-
jective of [REDACTED] operation; (b) ensure that both are of
one mind; and (c) determine the most effective course
of action and how it could be expeditiously supported
by [REDACTED] Task Force if we are to succeed in next 33 days.

Although PDC El Salvador has not yet taken official
position regarding Chilean elections, public statement
which is to be issued this week is not expected to differ
from these.

[REDACTED]

Newspaper articles, special features, editorials, wire service coverage, and radio and TV broadcasts are being generated on a daily basis. Items appeared in: La Presencia, La Paz; El Dia, and The News, Mexico City; O Estado, Sao Paulo; El Mercurio, and La Segunda, Santiago; El Imparcial, La Hora, and Prensa Libre, Guatemala City; La Prensa, Buenos Aires; La Es-trella de Panama, Panama City; El Dia, Tegucigulpa.

Santiago Station is working closely with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as a means of getting the message to the public that resistance to Marxism and Allende does exist and is active.

[REDACTED] attempts make a deal with Allende and planning send representatives consult with leaders of PDC-Chile.

Most items dealing with the Chilean situation follow themes outlined in Santiago and Headquarters guidances, including those not a direct result of Agency efforts. Not all publicity is favorable or exploitable. Some incorporate themes which blame U. S. foreign economic policy and Alessandristas for the present problem rather than Chilean leadership in general or PDC-Chile in particular.

The Station has given this organization some funds [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This is important piece of information for planning purposes.

[REDACTED]

At request of higher authority Station forwarded detailed evaluation of PCCH paramilitary capability noting their ability to wage and sustain civil disturbances and paramilitary urban attack which could effectively defy all but concerted and united combined effort of Army and carabinero forces. PCCH counter coup planning calls for general strike and simultaneous occupation of factories and industries, including railroads, port and dock facilities, electric plants and communications facilities.

[REDACTED]

Station requested to forward estimates of Chilean Army needs for arms, tear gas, ammunition and communications equipment.

PCCH planning and organizing for paramilitary operations is reportedly well advanced and its influence and domination over mass popular organizations, such as the CUT and affiliates, and student federations insures them of large sources of manpower from these sectors.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

During meeting which Frei had with some unidentified cabinet ministers and selected generals [REDACTED]

prior to 18 Sept Independence celebrations he asked for suggestions how to prevent communist takeover. Only Gen. Huerta replied, declaring he favors joint Army/Carabinero action to save Chile.

[REDACTED] PN [REDACTED] indicate that Alessandri has learned Frei has all but given up hope of parliamentary solution and considering opening negotiations with Allende.

[REDACTED]

meeting of Gen Schneider 21 Sept with some of generals assigned in Santiago area. In meeting Schneider reaffirmed his "constitutionalist" position of guaranteeing democratic presidential succession process. Notes planned meeting with Frei and indicates he will resign if Frei asks him to abandon his constitutional position.

This step one of several contingency moves made in event Allende takes office.

This is first indication that Frei has actually met with members of high command to discuss possibility of military solution.

This is first evidence that Alessandri may be considering change in previous no Allende contacts position. Private meeting of Alessandri and key party advisors was scheduled for evening of 22 Sept and reports expected 23 Sept.

Another step in planning for "after Allende" developments.

General Schneider clearly remains stumbling block to military move, and is frankly considered so by Frei. They to meet evening 22 Sept.

[REDACTED]

On 23 September carried article which notes non-Marxist members of Allende's coalition provoked into public admission that danger of Communist take-over exists "in theory" by telephone campaign which has been conducted among well-to-do Chileans since election of 4 September.

Headquarters sent list of proposals to Station

Station passed total of [redacted] to [redacted]

Station replied to Headquarters' clarification of Track I and II compartmentation within U. S. Government circles as it effects relations with the Ambassador.

Station developing and utilizing this organization for covert action.

Headquarters' original message prompted by desire keep Track I and II lines straight. Station makes case for realistic difficulties regarding this attempted compartmentation, given the Ambassador's own political action initiatives.

...continue to produce
press, TV and Radio materials based
on standing propaganda guidances, with
items appearing daily. Also giving
lateral replay of materials [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The important Caracas daily El Universal of 23 Sept carried front page story based on interview with Acting President of Venezuelan Christian Democratic Party (COPEI) in which he quoted as opposed to PDC-Chile attempts to make a deal with Allende. Story also carried in Ultimas Noticias and La Verdad.

Headquarters requested Station views
on new tack in propaganda campaign
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reports information
provided by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] that Frei
intends permit coup attempt led by
General Viaux within next few days.

Station suggested TF officer contact [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to persuade
him apply pressure on PDC-Chile leaders,
to accept or work for Frei's plan of
creating constitutional vacuum which
Armed Forces would have to fill.

Propaganda coverage continues at high level.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

These remarks came after weekly meeting of COPEI
leaders with President Caldera, which was noted by
the press, and may give item added impact.
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This report unconfirmed, although Santiago Station
notes that military coup possibility exists and
[REDACTED] interested in promoting it.

Santiago Station proposal based on perceptive long
distance analysis of PDC-Chile dilemma [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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consider attempting [REDACTED]

Station approved travel of [REDACTED]

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Department informed Ambassador of Department's decision to support Frei's candidacy for reelection if he given opportunity to run again by military action. Also told advise military they can count on continued MAP program.

Chilean [REDACTED] volunteered information that military looking for way out (of 24 October election).

Santiago Station sent preliminary reply to Headquarters request for outline of course of action noting narrowness of options which essentially military.

[REDACTED] suggesting play be given to Allende intentions for major changes in Armed Forces.

Message passed [REDACTED]

This information volunteered to [REDACTED]

Station pointed out narrowness of options regarding coup possibilities and uncertainties of military performance prior to, during, and after coup.

Guidance outlines three possible lines of exploitation which intended create concern among military about future of Armed Forces under an Allende government.

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Santiago sent suggested article for Headquarters [redacted] "hinting" at possibility of military solution.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Regarding Chile which basically pessimistic, discounts Frei's ability to arrange Allende's defeat, and doubts that Chileans able to resist totalitarian which he believes would culminate in Marxist state within two years.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Article, to which Headquarters has suggested certain modifications, designed to surface the possibility of a coup as a conditioner.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

The Foreign Minister believes that emergence of a Communist Chile would have divisive effect in Argentina.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Station now producing quality articles [redacted] and replay on more specific themes emphasizing potential of Soviet threat.

A special [redacted] feature dealing with the Chile situation being prepared [redacted]

"Patria y Libertad" organization held organization held second successful public assembly in Estadio de Chile protesting Allende presidency.

Representatives of the PN and Allende forces held exploratory discussions which dealt primarily with role of PCCH in an Allende government.

[redacted]
Ambassador sent message to State and White House in which he indicates that he has instructed U.S. military and Agency not to actively encourage military coup.

[redacted]
Frei discussions with Gen. Schneider inconclusive. Schneider still holds to Constitutionalist position. Frei has ruled out cabinet resignations for time being, and PDC opened discussions with Allende.

direction for greater impact. [redacted]

[redacted] Influential Latin American and European newspapers are agreeing to extended treatment of Chilean developments in special features and editorials, and are also sending reputable correspondents for on-site investigations.

[redacted] based on previous Hqs and Santiago Station guidances.

[redacted] this mushrooming organization only organized resistance to Allende and asks for moral support from press and political action assets. [redacted]

PN representatives attempting play for time to allow for further military coup developments.

Ambassador rules out likelihood of provoking successful military coup and proposes major effort to provoke economic crisis prior to 24 October. Station concurs with this position, for time being.

Frei still not providing necessary leadership for creation of coup atmosphere.

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

New York Times 25 September featured article emphasizing rapid and serious economic decline in Chilean economy in three week period since Allende obtained the plurality of votes cast in the national elections of 4 September.

Santiago Station reported at length on meeting with Frei in which he told by representatives of group of three ministers who have been discussing political situation since elections that he was the major stumbling block to a solution of the problem. Asked him resign, and for authority to give instructions to the military to take action. He agreed.

Station proposed for Headquarters consideration possibility of General Valenzuela resigning with flaming appeal to other generals which intended split Army and force Frei act.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Partial text relayed to Santiago for exploitation.

This is a significant development and adds new ingredient to the coup plotting.

Headquarters considering.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[redacted] makes another argument for early briefing of Ambassador.

Ambassador replied [redacted] to Department's authorization to support Frei noting Frei assumes U.S. will support him. He points out he has urged hard approach on part of [redacted] in upcoming bargaining.

[redacted] report continued replay of Chile theme materials.

Station forwarded plan for maximum exploitation [redacted] which calls for sponsorship of series of radio broadcasts over as many as [redacted] stations, street interviews, TV commentaries, poster campaigns and covering of public meetings.

[redacted]
Ambassador has obviously begun his "economic pressure campaign".

Propaganda activities continue to generate good coverage of Chile developments along our theme guidance. New suggested themes being developed which depict [redacted]

[redacted] Allende as having acted as intermediary for Castro.

[redacted]
Station noted that political reporting shallow, based primarily on press and radio commentary with no apparent inside or special sources.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Santiago reports on group of PDC members still working to develop opposition to PDC negotiation with Allende and pro-Allende vote in Congressional run-off.

Santiago station reports contacts with outside case officer by representative of anti-Communist groups [REDACTED]

Group allegedly counting on leadership of General Viaux.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This step reflects Ambassador's personal belief that economic crisis all that can provoke military intervention

[REDACTED]

Among these guarantees were: (a) retention of General Huerta, Commander of the carabineros; (b) PDC consulted on appointments of Ministers of Defense and Interior; (c) that all PDC conditions be given "legal" status. At Allende request two of these "guarantees" not made public, and PDC Council annoyed with this agreement by PDC negotiators.

Information requested to identify possible channels for surfacing disinformation within command levels of Chilean Army.

Frei is aware of the activities of this group and encouraged them to continue. There some difficulties with this group, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Station has approved giving some assistance to this group, [REDACTED]

Station advised asset not to assist this group, although arranging for station contact for assessment of groups intentions possible of capabilities.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Long Korrygram of 26 September reports on Ambassador's talks with Minister of Defense Ossa and his meetings with Frei.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

These articles [redacted] intended to heat up the atmosphere and put pressure directly on the principal actors. [redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] indicates Communists intend
full scale campaign to denigrate Frei after 4 November
and eliminate him as possible leader of PDC opposition.

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Depending on the outcome of this meeting COS planning
meet with [REDACTED]

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COS Santiago, who consulted at Headquarters, agrees
but defers to Station for concurrence.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Headquarters approved Santiago [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Station Santiago requests Headquarters
attempt locate [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to make statement re
Chile [REDACTED]

Ambassador wants cabled text of statement for
delivery to PDC in Santiago.

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Article will appear in weekly publication
30 September.

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Buenos Aires La Prensa continues to
replay El Mercurio editorials.

La Prensa, influential Buenos Aires daily has
given extensive and continuing coverage to Chilean
developments.

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[REDACTED] Brazil
is not prepared to participate in any intervention
at this time.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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This request is part of the Ambassador's program to induce a downswing in the Chilean economy and to provoke military intervention.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Santiago press is giving extensive coverage to recent bombings and other terrorist acts to show that they are the work of rightists who are attempting to smear and provoke the press. El Siglo and Puro Chile are having a field day attacking and implicating Patria y Libertad, Radical Democrats, and AID Public Safety Advisor Joseph Vasile who was identified in one article as an "AID and CIA representative" who is providing financial support to Patria y Libertad.

[REDACTED]

Representatives of Anaconda Co. advised Ambassador Korry that a group of military persons, excluding the top military leaders, are prepared to launch a coup if they can be given certain assurances (presumably by the USG). Ambassador Korry refused to reply to this proposal.

Ambassador Korry told the U.S. business community Friday that rightists were trying to foment coups and that Allendistas might be pushing them into abortive actions that could only seal Allende's victory.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] local press of 28-29 September carries several articles and editorials ridiculing the idea of negotiating guarantees with a Communist controlled Allende government, suggesting that a military GOLPE may be better solution than Communist government, and pointing out hazards to military if generals passed-over by lower ranks in reorganization.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Among those reported featuring editorials and special articles were: El Siglo and La Republica, Bogota; Jornal do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro; El Nacional, Caracas; El Pais and El Telegrafo, Montevideo; Excelsior, Mexico City; Sun, Georgetown; El Imparcial and Prensa Libre, Guatemala City; La Informacion and Listin Diario, Santo Domingo.

Station reporting indicates that Foreign Minister Valdes has informed all Chilean diplomatic posts to do everything possible to preserve an atmosphere of confidence and to explain that Chile under Allende will not differ from Chile under Frei.

[REDACTED] The Ambassador has reiterated his request for details about the guarantees negotiated by the Social Christians with the Communists in Czechoslovakia.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This is indicative of the division within Frei's cabinet and the PDC.

[REDACTED]

The Ambassador wants to pass this information to Minister of Defense Ossa for his use in the PDC junta meeting.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
Santiago press giving considerable attention to Yarur bombing incident which was carried out by a rightist group.

[REDACTED]
PCCh leaders have expressed concern over the possibility that an attempt will be made to assassinate Allende in order to provoke a military coup.

State Department authorized U.S. Ambassador Lodge to use the White House back-grounder as reflecting the administration's views on Chile. This backgrounder was utilized by the DCM during a meeting with Argentine Deputy Minister Ruda on 28 September.

[REDACTED]
Ambassador Korry recommended that State Department take no action on the GOC's request to use \$1.3 million for cattle purchase.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
PCCh sources report an official in the Department of Investigation recently confirmed to the PCCh that a plot to kill Allende exists. This official told a party leader that an unnamed rightist is behind the assassination plot.

[REDACTED]
Ambassador Korry believes that if the loan is approved before 24 October, it would be widely interpreted as de facto U.S. aid for Allende.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

El Popular, the Communist newspaper of Montevideo carried an article 29 Sep alleging Alessandristas planning to assassinate Allende.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Hqs advised [REDACTED] to replay information about Foreign Minister Valdes orders to all Chilean diplomatic missions to down play threat of Allende government.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This article accused Agency of U.S. AID official of being involved and blasted "Partia y Libertad."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This intended provoke internal PDC battle challenging Valdes loyalty, perhaps forcing action to remove him from Cabinet.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Acting Director, DIA advised Army Attache in Santiago to work closely with COS in contacting and advising principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move to deny Allende the presidency. Army Attache agreed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

with the exception of Gen. Schneider, all Chilean generals and most subordinate officers favor coup.

According to the Chilean Navy Chief of Staff advised Navy Commanders that on two separate occasions, groups of Admirals had met with Presidential aspirant Allende and discussed issues of "common interest." The meetings received prior approval of the Navy CINC, Minister of Defense and President Frei.

Santiago Station will surface to Pres. Frei a story that Communists plan to launch (after 4 Nov) worldwide campaign to discredit him.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Army Attache was told not to advise Ambassador or the Defense Attache of these instructions.

The Ambassador is producing some excellent prop ideas and pegs which we may be able to use for prop replay.

[REDACTED]

The Admirals told Allende they were concerned about the impact that severed connections with the U.S. Navy would have upon the Chilean Navy. Allende reportedly assured the Admirals he was aware of these problems and they should not worry because he contemplates no great changes in Naval leadership.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

██████████ believes Frei knows that replacing General Schneider could lead to military coup but he does not think Frei has political skill or courage to pull the right levers to make coup succeed.

[REDACTED]

This press operation will be used to produce black propaganda.

This officer is due to arrive in Santiago [REDACTED]

PCCh critical of UP lack of plans for implementing program after 4 November inauguration of Allende.

Headquarters relayed [REDACTED]

copy of New York Times article reporting on Allende's rebuff of the PDC demands for constitutional guarantees.

[REDACTED]

"National Organization of Democratic Newspapermen" (ONAPED) of Venezuela declared in a 1 October article which appeared in Ultimas Noticias, that Allende's accession to power would constitute a grave threat to democratic freedoms in America.

[REDACTED] reported on measures planned by the UP for gaining control of the LAN-Chile airlines.

Lengthy El Mercurio editorial of 1 October attacks Allende's refusal to guarantee democratic freedoms as requested by PDC, and describes Communist moves to institute greater control over all aspects of Chilean life even before Allende confirmed.

A branch of "Patria y Libertad" has been established in Concepcion under the name "Movimiento Civico Patria y Libertad."

PCCh especially disturbed that no plans have been prepared for nationalization of banks and copper industry, provision of uniforms and free education and minimum wage increase.

Maximum replay requested prior to 3-4 October PDC junta to bring pressure on PDC congressman to support parliamentary approach.

[REDACTED]

ONAPED is a bona fide association of journalists of some 500 members. [REDACTED]

This report indicates that UP plans to establish worker control of LAN-Chile airlines, and that a continental federation of LAN-Chile employees, including those in the U.S. is also planned.

[REDACTED] Editorial supposedly reflects official position of Frei.

El Siglo of 1 October ran a particularly vicious article attacking "Patria" [REDACTED]

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Caracas daily El Mundo of 30 September carried half page communique attributed to women's organizations which denounces Frei and the PDC for failing to realize true nature of Communist threat posed by Allende.

According to PCCh [REDACTED], the Communists are planning to deploy members of its mass organization on 24 October and 4 November, to occupy selected buildings and seal off residential areas in Santiago if Allende is not elected and inaugurated.

UP leaders have requested and are receiving lists of all U.S., Puerto Rican, and non-Havana documented Cuban citizens who have been issued Chilean visas since June 1970.

PCCh [REDACTED] report that the UP is attempting to put together a complete file on the personnel activities and agents of the CIA in Chile.

U.S. Ambassador to Rome discussed the Chilean situation with [REDACTED] who informed the Ambassador that it was his understanding that President Frei was extremely concerned over the outcome of the Chilean election, and could see no way out of the dilemma.

As a result of discussions with COS at Headquarters, priority effort will be made to contact and influence the following military figures: a) [REDACTED] b) General Valenzuela c) [REDACTED]

Statement [REDACTED] closes with a warning to women of the continent to beware of the puppets of communism, [REDACTED]

PCCh is planning to place its people in the slum areas which surround Santiago.

UP leaders have requested that no additional official and diplomatic visas be issued to U.S. nationals.

UP leaders are using members of the United Popular Action Movement (MAPU) to work with PDC members in government to obtain information in the CIA.

[REDACTED] agreed to advise Ambassador Martin of any impressions he gathers from a meeting of Christian Democratic parliamentarians in Holland when he returns to Rome on 3 October.

Other military figures, who might play decisive roles, will be approached when possible. [REDACTED]

that if
Nikende wins, the U.S. will not be in
a position to provide

Two "false flag" staffers will proceed to Santiago [REDACTED]

Anaconda miners went out on strike on 1 October. The GOC strong stand is heartening, especially since Minister of Mines Hales is now playing his role loyally with Frei.

Committee also prepared to suspend for this period the processing and delivery of FMs as well as all other elements of MAP such as grant material.

Hopefully a strong message from the USG will influence Frei's course of action and provide him with useable material for his speech to the PDC. Ambassador Korry cannot consider it physically possible or psychologically opportune at this time.

Company sources, however, anticipate early resumption of negotiations.

[REDACTED] He believes General Viala is best choice for focusing the Chilean Military against Allende.

General Camilo Valenzuela told [REDACTED] that orders to take over the government and prevent Allende from becoming president would not be forthcoming, and should General Viala decide to move on his own, he would not succeed.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Christian Democratic Dutch daily De VOLKSKRANT carried article sourcing New York Times dealing with Allende turn down of PDC guarantees.

Article by Washington correspondent of Die Welt appeared in 2 October issue replaying IAPA statement.

Alessandri reiterated his intention to resign if elected in 24 October run-off in letter to Ultima Hora.

[REDACTED]
General Valenzuela also relayed General Schneider's conversation with Frei in which Frei: a) described worsening economic and political situation b) disavowed ever considering resigning or naming a military cabinet c) denied being demoralized d) advised the military to wait until results of congressional vote are known before acting.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
This is the third largest daily in Holland, and is first significant treatment of Chilean situation in Dutch press.

[REDACTED]
Alessandri's letter was prompted by an article in Ultima Hora which alleged he believes Allende should be selected on basis of receiving first relative popular majority.

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Wire service reports of Allende's rebuff of PDC guarantees given wide play in world press. Items appeared in: [REDACTED]

Ex-President Lleras departed Bogota 2 October for Santiago where he will meet Frei and Allende.

Chilean Bishops issued statement calling for "Christian acquiescence" to Allende victory.

Santiago Station reports very little external propaganda getting into Santiago press; thus impact is impossible to judge.

Korrygram to State and White House summarizes Ambassador's discussions with local U.S. business representatives, some of whom agreed to hold tight line in collective bargaining and bill collecting.

Wide publication of this development may strengthen Frei position in PDC junta.

Lleras is tentatively scheduled to attend private dinner with Allende, which, if true, could be serious blow to PDC efforts. [REDACTED]

Lleras concerned about possible reaction U.S. businessmen.

Bad for PDC, good for UP and Allende.

There is almost no local press reaction to what outside world saying about Chile; and El Mercurio editorial line has been disappointedly cautious.

Ambassador also notes suspicion that Frei already conceding Allende election and making plans for large PDC role in Allende government because of need for help during expected serious economic period following inauguration.

Near panic of team subsided appreciably with promise of financial help in resettlement and report that Yarur arrestees to be released. [REDACTED] making arrangements for recontact in Buenos Aires.

Time magazine will feature Chile cover story in 12 October issue.

[REDACTED]

Weekly news magazine PEC surfaced article alleging a secret pre-election agreement between Tomic and Allende was negotiated by President of PDC.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Ambassador Korry had a series of local meetings 3 October, including ex-President Lleras, to press his argument that Frei must act to stop Allende and Communism in Chile.

Date of this story advanced as result of efforts of [REDACTED] Time correspondent requested Agency briefing which being arranged.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PN ready to follow PDC lead. If PDC does not oppose Allende of abstain, PN will not oppose alone and will attempt to develop strength as loyal opposition.

[REDACTED]

Ambassador learned that Frei had received letters from Romulo Betancourt, and Jacques Martain in which both told Frei that PDC must oppose Communism. Additional meetings of Lleras and other contacts of the Ambassador with Frei are expected to press this point.

Headquarters urged Santiago Station make greater effort to have worldwide propaganda coverage of Chile situation replayed in Santiago.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PCCh concerned over the maneuvers of the MIR to promote additional land seizures.

PS leader commented [REDACTED] that the PCCh is trying to relegate the PS to a secondary position, and that the UP does not believe the Chilean military will attempt a coup.

Leading PN member believes that the military and General Viaux no longer will act to block Allende.

[REDACTED]

A Chilean military source reports that Alfonso Naranjo Urrutia and Tulio Marambio are attempting to line up support to prevent the inauguration of Allende. They allegedly are in contact with General Viaux concerning the possibility of a coup.

Replay prompted by Santiago report that worldwide press attention to Chile situation generated by Agency not being given much attention in Santiago.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PCCh fears that such MIR action will create an unfavorable image for the UP because many Chileans believe the MIR to be part of the UP.

This PS leader was part of a PS commission which met with Allende shortly after the election. The military officers assured the commission that they had no interest in a coup and requested only that their situation be taken into account.

In his opinion the solution for Chile's problems have to be looked for in the political field and within the constitutional framework.

As first order of business, Station plans to turn over contact with [REDACTED]

Urrutia is a member of the PDC, and Marambio is former Minister of Defense and an advisor to the PDC on military matters.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] held two meetings with senior military officers in the Santiago area on 2 October. The Generals reiterated that the armed forces would maintain its constitutional role of upholding the electoral process.

[REDACTED] briefed by COS on 4 October. He now understands principal objective and will condition high-level military contacts of proven discretion to start working toward military solution with necessary assurances that they can proceed with full moral backing USG and within reason can depend on our material support once they decide to act.

The UP announced the afternoon of 2 October that it would set up joint team with PDC to discuss preparation of certain guarantees in form of Congressional amendment.

They added that the military would not intervene in the political arena unless there is a complete breakdown of public order and the people clamor for interventions.

[REDACTED] will not be asked to involve himself in military plotting on the fringes of armed forces (Viaux et al) [REDACTED] He will almost immediately contact [REDACTED] who is believed to be [REDACTED] disposed to act.

This about-face by Allende no doubt intended to take starch out of PDC delegates prior to 3-4 October junta meetings.

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[REDACTED] is preparing video tapes for lateral replay of one hour TV program dealing with Chile situation.

The PDC junta voted 271 to 191 to support Allende provided that a constitutional amendment can be arranged beforehand.

Buenos Aires La Prensa of 4 October carried article entitled the "Communist Strategy in Chile" which attacks the Communists for attempting to lull the people of Chile into an unsuspecting calm so that they can be eventually taken over by surprise.

Ultimas Noticias of Caracas in 5 October issue carried an article attacking the refusal by Allende to accept PDC guarantees.

[REDACTED]

Although Allende has already agreed to discussions with the PDC regarding a constitutional amendment, he may encounter some difficulties in granting this concession because of friction within the UP.

[REDACTED]

This article points out that the Communists control the UP and expect to control the government of Allende.

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[REDACTED] reports that [REDACTED]
sent strong message to Frei and PDC in
which he advised Frei that any solution
would be better (for Chile) than permitting
Allende to take over.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COS Santiago recommended that no action be
taken by [REDACTED] that would be considered
provocative or would pinpoint USG hostility
to Chile.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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The article is entitled "Allende will not resist
Soviet Infiltration".

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Station contact with [REDACTED] planned
in normal context.

[REDACTED] will be contacted via [REDACTED]
and General Valenzuela will not
be contacted directly, since [REDACTED]

On 5 October [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] told [REDACTED]
that the US is unhappy over the
Allende situation, and is prepared to help
in any way to eliminate this threat.

Station current priority is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] appreciated receiving this information,
admitted he did have [REDACTED] organization of dissatisfied
individuals, that they were not yet ready to
make a move. [REDACTED]

In this Korrygram, the Ambassador expressed his
preference that we cease to check all coup reports,
and that it would be better if the USG were totally
surprised by whatever might develop in the Armed
Forces. Hence he instructed [REDACTED] and DAO to desist
from all normal efforts to learn of possible
military moves.

[illegible]

Santiago Station reported that General Viaux has been in contact with and has received pledges of support from a number of officers in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Carabineros.

Supporters of Alessandri are providing financial support to Viaux to help him carry out his activities.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Ambassador Korry reports that PDC has named "stacked" negotiating team for discussion of constitutional amendment with Allende composed of Leighton, Fuentealba, and Maira.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ambassador Korry suggests consideration be given to supporting PDC groups with following among workers, women's groups, pobladores.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This group is determined to see Allende elected whatever the circumstances. Korry reiterated his plea to come to Washington.

Station suggests this "proposal" of the Ambassador not be approved, and suggests instead that covert action concentrate on reconstituting political center.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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O Globo of Rio carried front page story
6 October calling for Brazil and Argentina
to unite to confront the Chilean situation.

Santiago Station was requested to begin at
once a rumor campaign which could help
create a coup climate.

will attempt to see General
Camilo Valenzuela and advise him that the
USG is unhappy with the prospect of an
Allende Presidency, and is prepared to help
deny him the office.

COS briefed who promised to
attempt to contact General Valenzuela
and ask to dissuade
Viaux from attempting a coup.

The Station was asked to assign "false flag"
officers the task of planting at least three rumors
each day for the next ten days.

will also take the opportunity to caution
Valenzuela about precipitous moves by General Viaux.

will not promise USG support for any later
Viaux move.

[REDACTED]

Latest message from the Ambassador notes that [REDACTED] had pre-Junta private meeting with Frei during which he urged Frei to intervene in PDC junta and do whatever possible to stop Allende.

Ambassador Korry also met with Ossa and discussed possibilities still open to Frei to stop Allende.

[REDACTED]

POCH representatives of the UP proposed that security plans of UP should include the formation of "Committees for the Defense of the Revolution" using existing UP campaign committees and the trade unions as the basic organizational units.

[REDACTED]

The Ambassador said Ossa did not request direct assistance and speculated that Ossa was feeling out various scenarios in which Frei might act.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UP claims greatest problem is identifying police and security officials with whom the UP can work.

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The initial report arrived morning of 8 October.

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[REDACTED]
Station officer, posing as [REDACTED]
met [REDACTED] on October 7. [REDACTED]
claims to be in close contact with General
Viaux in plotting coup. He believes Viaux
has many men in Armed Forces who would
follow him, but Viaux will not make move
until he sure of victory. (General
Valenzuela allegedly is the only General
thus far who committed to joining golpistas,
but he would join only after the fighting
in streets.)

Station plans to have him contact the Viaux camp.

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COS scheduled to meet with [REDACTED]
tonight to advise him that the USG is
prepared to help in denying Allende the
Presidency.

Ambassador Korry informed Minister of
Defense Ossa privately last night of USG
decision to hold in abeyance military
programs until new Chilean government
policies are clarified.

The Ambassador also sent Ossa a letter outlining
USG intentions concerning the MAP program.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A third article appeared in Impacto which was hard line rightist attack on the "Triumph of a Communist in Chile."

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[REDACTED] has been asked by PDC Women Against Allende organization to finance six page daily newspaper to be produced in 10,000 copies.

A majority of the political commission of the PN met late 7 October and favored making an agreement with Allende to either support him or abstain in 24 October run-off.

[REDACTED]

The PN is waiting for a reply from Allende to an aide memoire in which PN expresses concern about certain aspects of the UP program.

[REDACTED]

The prestigious Berlin daily Der Tagesspiegel carried lengthy article which emphasizes the Marxist pro-Castro orientation of Allende's program while lamenting PDC's loss of identity as a national party during Frei's administration.

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A false flag staffer was instructed to have [redacted] put him in touch with General Viaux. This officer will not deny that the US will offer Viaux moral, financial, and material (arms) support in behalf of unidentified US group.

[redacted] was contacted yesterday by [redacted] [redacted] told [redacted] that the officers [redacted] had been working with a high ranking member of the government in trying to exert force on Frei to remove General Schneider. Once Schneider is removed, they intend to launch a coup.

Ambassador Korry met with [redacted] Defense Attache and DCOS on 8 October and strongly opposed any US involvement in a coup attempt because of the high degree of possibility it could fail, tarnish US image and place Allende firmly in the saddle.

[redacted] has made it clear to his [redacted] contacts [redacted] that if they do not move now, there may be no next time.

If Viaux needs arms, the Station will request Headquarters to lay on arms drop. Station believes Viaux's requirements will consist of small arms (including sub-machine guns) and ammo.

[redacted]

Ambassador preparing message along these lines, and may be considering orders to [redacted] and Station to cease all military contacts to prevent later accusations by Allende if coup attempted and fails.

COS similarly advised [redacted] and [redacted] that the USG favors a military solution and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright military intervention. COS asked [redacted] to use whatever leverage [redacted] possesses in military circles to convince the Armed Forces only salvation lies in military take-over.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Station reported that General Viaux told his followers on 7 October that the Armed Forces and the Carabineros will support the coup. He specifically mentioned the infantry school, the motorized units, the artillery regiments, the military school, and all of the Air Force as examples of his military backing.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Viaux added that there were no civilian political leaders involved in his coup and that a military junta would be formed to govern Chile. He said he would be the leader of the junta.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

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Story [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Santiago Station reports that PCCH leaders are increasing their contacts in the military and are not concerned about the possibility of a coup.

Santiago Station limiting distribution of press to metropolitan addressees.

[REDACTED]

Santiago Station reports that the PCCH and PS are competing for control of the Chilean security services. They are interested in tracking unregistered Americans who have recently entered the country, of identifying Agency activities.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] met with General Viaux. Viaux claimed that they were planning to "go" this weekend but the officer's arrival prompted them to suspend their plans.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Station notes that the PCCH has always been hypersensitive to any possible coup developments and has traditionally functioned as a coup barometer.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To prove his bona fides the officer was told by Viaux to arrange an airdrop consisting of: 150 noise grenades, 150 paralyzing grenades, 50 sub-machine guns and ammo, 50 grenade launchers, 300 tear gas shells and 330 gas masks. Viaux said "no drop, no talks". Viaux allegedly has a small landing field and aircraft of undisclosed type.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Paris newspaper Combat carried 9 October article which ridicules the idea of negotiating guarantees with Allende.

Santiago Station reports that the PCCh is planning to maintain a victory atmosphere through the 24 October elections.

Extremists leftist groups carried out two publicized incidents in which students occupied the main administration building of the University of Chile, and others demonstrated in the Plaza Italia.

On 12 October [redacted] met with Station false flag officer. [redacted] wanted to make corrections and clarification regarding Viaux's needs, specifically that the arms drop is needed for the forces in the Santiago area where the Army strength is only six units, and that they are not certain the Army [redacted] with Viaux.

Discussions included plans for statements in El Siglo and mass rallies of workers, campesinos, and pobladores. Some members of the PCCh are apprehensive about mass rallies fearing they may contribute to an atmosphere of tension.

These incidents provoked strong critical statements by the Armed Forces commanders and the UP.

Allende is also reportedly concerned about attempts to pressure the Chilean military to intervene to prevent Allende from taking over. He is working hard to offset these pressures on the Chilean military.

To ensure the support of some Army officers Viaux requested life and disability insurance policies. He claims he needs five blank policies up to \$50,000 and 20 other policies up to \$25,000. Apparently the Army officers in Santiago will not participate in a coup without this insurance.

Station false flag officer met with General Viaux for a second time on [REDACTED] October. Viaux explained the technical details of the air drop and reiterated his request for insurance policies.

General Schneider reminded all the top Army Commanders from the Santiago area last week that the role of the Armed Forces in Chile is to uphold the Constitution (support Allende).

PCCh leaders are not overly concerned by an isolated coup threat by Viaux and his followers. They believe that the recent agreement between the UP and PDC signifies that Viaux is acting without the support of the Government, PDC and the high command of the Armed Forces and, consequently, his coup is doomed to failure.

Ambassador Korry scheduled to arrive in Washington 12 October for consultations with the Department.

Santiago Station reports that Allende is becoming increasingly concerned about his image abroad and is attempting to promote the organization of "Committees of Solidarity" within foreign countries.

The influential O Estado de Sao Paulo of 11 October carried an editorial entitled, "The Auto-Destruction of the Chilean Social Christian Party," which highlights self-deluding activities of the PDC which have led to the present dilemma.

El Mercurio reported this development in 11 October issue.

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Station false-flag staffer departed Santiago.

Sudden departure necessary for two reasons: (1)

and (2) Viaux asked officer to carry details of proposed drop zone to "his superiors."

Station false-flag officer met with Viaux group several times on October. Faced with ultimatum to produce or get out, the officer was instructed by Station to offer earnest money and explain that failure to meet drop deadline was caused by lack of a secure commo channel. accepted money and told the officer that he had established his bona fides.

10 October Puro Chile carried an article which reports that retired Army Major Arturo Marshall is in touch with Americans.

Station reported that Senator Alberto Jerez, a leader of MAPU, is serving as the principal contact for Salvador Allende with the Armed Forces.

False-flag approach was unsuccessful and Viaux certainly is aware that he is in touch with an Agency of the USG.

Viaux says that he needs paralyzing gas for riot control more than anything else. If he is unable to move in a coup he will go "North" and set up a secessionist state.

One of the principal supporters of Allende in the Chilean Air Force is General Mario Vivero (Deputy Commander of the of the First Air Brigade in Antofagasta.)

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L'Economie is a bi-weekly slick magazine circulated by subscription to about 15,000 elites.

Headquarters had debriefed Station false flag staffer who was in contact with General Viaux. Station instructed to recontact Viaux ASAP and inform him that we cannot provide air drop or "paralyzing gas," but instead we can promise funding.

Valenzuela met with Viaux the night of 6 October and he believes Viaux will follow his advice.

Station was given approval to pledge up to \$250,000 for "insurance purposes" given a viable scheme by Viaux. But this insurance cannot include written documents.

██████ feels the Army must watch and be prepared to take action when Allende tries to do something that is unconstitutional. He added that should a coup occur, ██████ would be split into several camps.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

tried on several occasions to contact General Schneider without success. COS intends to meet with [REDACTED] today and stress USG support for military intervention.

Plans were made for a [REDACTED] staffer to contact this group.

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An editorial in the 14 October issue of El Tiempo laments the fact that a democratic and proud Chile stands to lose all it has struggled for when Allende takes over.

Two articles appeared in 13 October La Prensa of Lima which denounce Allende and Tomic and accuse Frei of being the Kerensky of Chile.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] met with
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] October. According to
the Viaux group will meet
on the night of 14 October to decide
whether they will move between 0200-
0700 on 17 October. First step in
coup will be the kidnapping of General
Schneider [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] claims Viaux commands 150 trained
and armed men who will serve as shock troops
and will take over media. This group is made
up of ex-military personnel and university
students.
[REDACTED]

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On the morning of 13 October General Viaux stated that he intends to kidnap General Schneider within the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a military coup.

COS intends to advise [REDACTED] that USG is prepared to promptly deliver support and material that might be required should the military intervene and civil disorder result.

[REDACTED] made a strong plea to [REDACTED] for a minimum of six gas grenades and four gas masks.

El Mercurio of 14 October reported that Admiral Hugo Tirado had temporarily replaced Admiral Fernando Porta as Navy Commander-in-Chief.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Tirado reputedly has given his wholehearted support to General [REDACTED] for a coup.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15 October issue of El Pais featured front page treatment of interview with Allende in which he became visibly irritated by questions about whether he is Communist and those relating to freedom of education and freedom of the press.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Yesterday the DDP and Dr. Kissinger and General Haig reviewed Track II policy, objectives and actions and decided to attempt to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Dr. Kissinger noted that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on Allende even after 4 November.

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COS met with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] on 24 October and scanned the
spectrum of available military options.
[REDACTED] was optimistic about coup
prospects prior to 24 October.

[REDACTED] attempts to contact [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] have thus far been
unsuccessful.

COS and [REDACTED] estimate that UP resis-
tance to a coup could not hold out
for more than 16 hours since they
are lightly armed and presumably
limited in ammunition supplies.

[REDACTED] plans to analyze recent developments for
[REDACTED] benefit today. He intends to
urge [REDACTED] to remove the [REDACTED] who had been
in contact with Allende and should Frei decline
to authorize this move. [REDACTED] will suggest to
[REDACTED] that he threaten resignation with optimum
publicity. This he believes will foment the
ambient of unrest in Armed Forces, needed to pro-
voke action.

[REDACTED] suspects that [REDACTED] is not disposed to meet
with him and COS.

This estimate is predicated on the assumption that
the Armed Forces armories are adequately protected.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] met clandestinely on 17 October with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who told him their plans were moving along better than they had thought possible. They asked that by the evening of 18 October [REDACTED] arrange to furnish them with 8 to 10 tear gas grenades. Also they need within 48 hours three sterile 45 calibre machine guns with 500 rounds of ammo each.

The Argentine Army is not massing in the southern part of Argentina as reported previously.

[REDACTED] cannot tell who is the leader of this movement but he strongly suspects it is [REDACTED]

Argentine Army maneuvers just concluded on the Paraguay and Brazilian border area will be the last large military exercises for the calendar year.

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[REDACTED]

Daily papers in Buenos Aires and Mendoza continue to replay articles which deal with the damaging results of Allende's relative minority at the polls, and the increasing number of "tourists" visiting Mendoza to transfer their savings in dollars from Chile.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Foreign Ministry officials believe that Allende will establish relations with Cuba shortly after assuming the presidency, but that relations with other communist countries will be studied carefully [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was contacted late Sunday evening by General Valenzuela who advised him that the military was ready to launch a coup. Valenzuela's plan includes the abduction of General Schneider and the resignation of President Frei and most of his cabinet.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] who [REDACTED] described as an excellent contact serving not only as a window to current coup plotting but as a possible resistance leader in the post 4 November period. [REDACTED] seemed sincere in his dedication to remove Allende from power; however, he is not sanguine about the chance of preventing Allende from taking office.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] arranged a meeting between [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
on 19 October. [REDACTED] withdrew discreetly,
however, when [REDACTED] pointedly stated
"this is a Chilean matter".

According to Radio Balmaceda, Major
Arturo Marshall was arrested on the morning
of 19 October by the Department of
Investigations. Marshall's hiding
place was surrounded and Marshall had to
be subdued with tear gas.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in
addition, [REDACTED] said the coup was
now set for Wednesday night and that the
abduction of General Schneider is the
first step in the coup attempt.

[REDACTED]
Station suggested that Headquarters make sure that
recognition follows on the heels of any
successful coup.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Viaux are [REDACTED] leaving for
Valparaiso on 19 October so [REDACTED] cannot be linked
to a coup.

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[REDACTED]

Santiago Station plans to shift emphasis after 25 October from propaganda to other more important priorities during period remaining until 4 November.

[REDACTED]

An article appeared in the 19 October issue of Paris daily Combat which blames Frei and the PDC for the current problems of Chile and highlights the threat of Communist domination.

[REDACTED]

The Communist newspaper in Montevideo El Popular has been busily defending the UP victory in Chile and attacking its detractors, especially Accion, which has been running a series on Chile with the theme that Allende's victory means Chilean democracy is near death.

[REDACTED]

Station notes that the prop campaign has made its point. Allende's forces have seen their image tarnished abroad and the military recognize the significance of an Allende regime.

This article clearly puts pressure on Frei noting that "...if (Frei) resolved to put the future of his country before his small personal interests, it is possible Chile could avoid falling into the Communist abyss."

The USP controls the Chiquicamata mineworkers union and is caught in the middle between Allende forces who wanted to settle immediately, and the workers who want maximum benefits. The PCCh stands to gain if the USP loses control.

[REDACTED]

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As a result of Alessandri's request that congress not vote for him, "Patria y Libertad" cancelled its last public event scheduled for 20 October and "Patria y Libertad" will be put to rest after 23 October Radio speech by its director.

The re-election of Sergio Jarpa as President of the PN during the PN General Assembly held weekend of 17 October signifies specific endorsement of Jarpa's position of opposing any type of future political arrangements between the PN and the Christian Democrats.

General Camilo Valenzuela visited [REDACTED] during the early hours of 20 October [REDACTED]. Valenzuela reported that General Schneider had left the party first, and that he had kept the other officers behind, providing the abductors "with ample time to act".

Station intends to withdraw ARMA from active participation in TRACK II activities before 24 October.

[REDACTED]
Valenzuela said he would call [REDACTED] when he had confirmation that Schneider had been kidnapped.

Station believes active plotting on [REDACTED] part beyond 24 October would pose hazards which not commensurate with any further advantages we could possibly gain.

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[REDACTED]

Major Marshall's arrest is receiving front page treatment linking him to General Viaux. The fact that a rifle with a telescopic sight was found in the house with Marshall is being used by the leftist press to show that Marshall intended to kill Allende.

[REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] to visit [REDACTED] on the afternoon of 20 October. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that Schneider's abduction was aborted because Schneider's car was too fast and the team became nervous due to inexperience. They will, however, try again the evening of 20 October.

The junta program, as outlined by Valenzuela, envisages a "government of the people" with emphasis on construction of roads, schools, and hospitals.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED] is in charge of this operation.

[REDACTED]

The junta is expecting the USG to be first among the nations recognizing it. Junta will lean heavily on the US for food, economic and technical aid.

[REDACTED]

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Prensa Libre (Guatemala City)
editorial of 20 October scores
Chilean Ambassador for his public
defense of Allende.

Message passed to [redacted] from [redacted]
[redacted] advising [redacted]
that suspension temporarily
imposed on MAP and FMS has been
rescinded.

This action is intended to place USG in a posture in which it can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as anticipated.

Army CINC General Rene Schneider machine-gunned the morning of 22 October. Three bullets struck Schneider and he underwent immediate surgery.

Major General Carlos Prats, 2nd highest ranking Army officer and Chief of National Defense General Staff temporarily assumed position of Army CINC.

State of emergency declared throughout Chile. Country divided into zones in which military officers given command of all armed forces and police. These officers assume open ended authority to censor the press, to regulate public assembly, and to issue all orders necessary for maintaining public order.

Reportedly General Viaux, Retired Lt. Col. Jose Cabrera, and six unidentified persons have been arrested including members of Patria y Libertad.

The three Armed Forces Commanders in Chief Major General Carlos Prats, Admiral Hugo Tirado, General Carlos Guerraty, issued a communique condemning and repudiating terrorist attack.

Allende met with President Frei at noon on 22 October.

Latest medical bulletin indicates that his condition has worsened and he will undergo a second operation.

Prats is a close friend of Gen. Schneider.

- 1) Armed Forces and Carabineros confined to barracks.
- 2) Military given responsibility for investigating plot.
- 3) All exits from Santiago controlled, including international airport.
- 4) Rigid curfew imposed from 12:30 to 6:00 A.M. 23 October and from midnight to 6:00 A.M. on 24 October.
- 5) Information media instructed not to publish or broadcast information concerning the attack on Schneider which could alarm or excite the public. Non-compliance with this order will result in the closure of the radio station or newspaper.

These arrests have not been confirmed.

This communique stated that the terrorist action will not stop the Chilean Armed Forces from performing their professional duties and observing constitutional norms.

Allende asked Frei to adopt drastic measures to crush the "seditious plan" which included the assault on General Schneider.

[REDACTED]

Technical students plan to demonstrate on the afternoon of 22 October, and the Chilean Confederation of Workers (CUT) called an emergency meeting that evening.

[REDACTED]

The UP issued a statement setting forth its position regarding the attempted assassination of General Schneider.

[REDACTED]

Retired General Emilio Cheyre was designated Chief of the Department of Investigations, Socialist ~~Edmundo Paredes~~ ^{Pere} ~~the personal physician of Allende~~ ^{Chief of Security} was named sub-director of Investigations.

[REDACTED]

General Camilo Valenzuela automatically assumed the position of Jefe de Plaza for law and order in Santiago province during the state of emergency.

[REDACTED]

The government is investigating the recent arrival of foreigners in Chile.

[REDACTED]

President Frei addressed the nation over nationwide radio on the evening of 22 October.

As of 2230 downtown Santiago was quiet and there have been no major disorders.

This communique: (a) repudiated assassination; (b) blamed attack on rightists supported by foreign elements; (c) condemned act as anti-patriotic; (d) affirmed UP's faith in the democratic process; and, (e) appealed to UP followers to remain alert during the next few days.

General Cheyre had been serving as intelligence coordinator for President Frei.

After President Frei's address to the nation, General Valenzuela spoke over nationwide radio on the evening of 22 October.

[REDACTED]

He expressed his profound indignation over the attempted assassination of General Schneider and declared a State of emergency.

[REDACTED]

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the PCCh is planning a series of demonstrations of mass organizations in reaction to the assassination attempt on General Schneider on 22 October.

PCCh is planning to increase its protection of PCCh Senators and Deputies as well as the PCCh headquarters.

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to communicate the following to Viaux's representative should he be re-contacted: (a) Viaux's version of events not in accordance with facts as known to us; therefore unwilling to pass them to President Frei or act as spokesman for Viaux with Chilean Government, (b) our commitment solely to insure lives of members of Viaux's group whose identity would be communicated to us - this was never done.

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[REDACTED]

The following were described during a press conference on 24 October by General Emilio Cheyre, Chief of Investigaciones, as the most important suspects in the shooting of General Schneider: Jose Jaime Melgoza, Juan Gustavo Valenzuela Salas, Americo Rojas Perez, Roberto Binet, Humberto Contreras, Wolfgango Melgoza.

[REDACTED]

Since 22 October about 150 persons have been arrested by the police for possible involvement in the attack on Schneider.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The CSTC was invited to attend the inauguration by the Confederation of Chilean Workers (CUTCh).

Santiago Station reports continued problems between the Socialist Party (PS) and the Communist Party (PCCh) over the allocation of cabinet positions.

Santiago Station reports that the PCCh intends to conduct a full-scale drive for new members under the Allende administration and to increase its influence over key mass organizations.

Ambassador Korry asked COS on 25 October if Station had been engaged in activities of any kind which could conceivably be used to support charges that the CIA was involved in Schneider's assassination.

As part of the Track II wrap-up, the Station has made a security review based on the assumptions that: (a) Allende will make every effort to implicate USG in Schneider's assassination, (b) General Viaux's group was responsible for the shooting and several senior military officers were in direct contact with Viaux in discussing the possibility of overthrowing the government, (c) General Viaux will not allow himself to be the "fall guy" for these active duty officers.

Chilean authorities are seeking General Viaux to "clarify some issues." Although Viaux is still at large, Argentine authorities in Mendoza turned over Viaux's brother-in-law without the benefit of extradition. This request was made via Interpol.

[REDACTED] the PCCh have indicated that they do not want to accept the Ministry of Labor but will push hard for the Foreign Minister appointment or the number two position in the Department of Investigations.

Key PCCh leaders believe that early months of Allende administration represents an ideal time for party recruitment.

COS replied that charges could obviously be made, but since the Station was not involved, the COS doubted that charges could be substantiated.

Station divided its security review into the following subjects: false flaggers, direct contacts, direct Station contacts, Embassy contacts, materials furnished to plotters and [REDACTED]

At least until 4 November established tradition of cooperation between Argentines and Chilean police likely to continue.

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Patria y Libertad leader Pablo
Rodriguez was released yesterday.
He was arrested on 25 October while
boarding a private plane.

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Santiago Station reports that the press secretary of the Soviet Embassy has stated that the U.P. should delay establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba until it can do so in concert with other Latin American countries.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

General Viaux made an official declaration yesterday afternoon in which he stated that he had never given instructions directly or indirectly to cause physical or moral injury to anybody.

According to Prensa Latina (24 October) General Cheyre told a press conference that gas masks had been taken from the detainees during the investigation of the attack on General Schneider.

[REDACTED] the U.P. will have enough internal problems establishing socialism in Chile and should not further complicate its international relations by immediate recognition of Cuba.

[REDACTED]

He added that he would put himself at the "disposition" of the Department of Investigations.

Another Prensa Latina release reported that Schneider's assailants fired at him with short arms although, "as was later proven" they had machine guns in another car."

[REDACTED]


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There are public indications that persons involved in Schneider's assassination include others than those directly involved in the shooting.

El Mercurio (26 October) quoted a socialist member of the Department of Investigations as stating: "We are investigating a very delicate situation, much more so than any of you might imagine." El Mercurio also carried on 26 October a story from Washington quoting an alleged participant in the attack on Schneider who was interviewed in Buenos Aires. He is quoted as saying "Important persons in the government and especially the army, led the group to believe that if Schneider were kidnapped, it would produce a golpe."

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The TV documentary film dealing with Chile situation [REDACTED] was aired the evenings of 19 and 20 October on Channel 6 in San Jose.

[REDACTED]

The 28 October issue of La Nacion contains details of firing of high-level police official in Mendoza for his complicity in delivering a group of Chileans to Chilean authorities without legal process.

[REDACTED]

Santiago Station reports that the Socialist Party (PS) is insisting that it be given the ministries of Interior, Defense and Foreign Relations in the Allende government.

Santiago Station reports that the PCCh is making plans for a massive UP demonstration of popular support for Allende on 3 November.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This article notes that the delivery of this group of Chileans to Chilean authorities was ordered by General Lanusse.

[REDACTED]

The PS has taken a firm position in negotiations with other members of the UP that it be awarded these positions, and blames the PCCh for UP failure to reach agreement on cabinet appointments.

The PCCh hopes to get as many as 500,000 persons in the streets in an effort to dispel any lingering doubts about Allende's popularity and as a final attempt to intimidate the opposition.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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General Viaux was arrested yesterday at the home of his lawyer.

Should any compromising information surface, Station was advised to take a "stonewall" position in response to press or government questions. All questions will be referred to the Public Affairs officer without comment.



Oscar Nunez, Secretary General of the USP has informed other party leaders that he was involved in a coup plot with General Viaux, and that he is concerned he will be arrested and implicated in the assassination.

Santiago Zone Military commander Camilo Valenzuela issued an order on 28 October establishing a media blackout, including dispatches of news abroad, on all statements by individuals under detention or investigation in connection with the Schneider slaying.


Viaux's lawyer called the police and told them that Viaux was waiting for them.

Even in the event of tangible proof, Station was advised to make "no comment" and deny involvement to Ambassador.



Nunez claims that Viaux is innocent of any complicity in the attack on Schneider, even though it was carried out by Viaux's followers. Nunez said that the plan to abduct Schneider was presented to Viaux, who rejected it. Nevertheless, some of Viaux's supporters, acting on their own, decided to ignore his position and attempted the abduction.

A State telegram commented that Viaux's surrender and the Valenzuela order are presumably related, as the latter is almost certainly designed to keep the media from reporting whatever the voluble Viaux might have to say. It went on to say that in the past reported indications that Viaux and Valenzuela were in contact and that this tie could explain Valenzuela's desire to keep Viaux and other conspirators blacked out.



[REDACTED] that Salvador Allende said Chile will become a center of assistance and training for Latin American revolutionary organizations.

Allende told members of the Chilean National Liberation Front (ELN) that his government will support these organizations by providing guerrilla training installations, political and insurgency training, financial support and refuge for revolutionaries. Allende said this support would have to be provided clandestinely in order to avoid becoming blockaded like Cuba.

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Prensa Latina quoted Allende as disclosing that two attempts have been made on his life since his election. It also quoted Allende as saying that "following a careful study of each foreign company the GOC will nationalize some of the companies in a manner commensurate with national needs and not out of a desire for revenge."

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A report late yesterday afternoon quoted Allende as saying that "we will not follow the dictates of the OAS if it tells us not to have relations with Cuba." Another report stated that Allende drew a parallel between the future Chilean government and the nationalist ideology of the Peruvian government.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[redacted] reported that retired General Marambio has replaced General Viaux as head of the movement to prevent Allende from coming to power. Marambio allegedly said that he would be meeting with unidentified Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force on the night of 29 October to decide when to move before 3 November.

[redacted] was called late last evening and asked to take back "all the stuff". (Presumably the materials supplied to the plotters). [redacted] replied that this could be done today.

On 28 October [redacted] re-contacted [redacted] who stated that when he first heard of Schneider's assassination he was quite upset, but since has been informed by [redacted] that the three machine guns and ammunition are still in [redacted] home and were never given to anybody. Also [redacted] still has three tear gas canisters and three masks and was told that [redacted] still has his three.

[redacted] feels that Schneider's assassination was the result of one of the many unconnected plots going on in Chile at the time and had nothing to do with the one that he was part of with [redacted]

Viaux's lawyer, Sergio Miranda Carrington, told reporters on 28 October that Viaux had given him "important documents which included some names of foreign individuals" and that he had sent these documents out of Chile.

Marambio said that General Camilo Valenzuela was involved but that they regarded General Prats as "taking the same position as Schneider". Marambio also said that General Joaquín Chinchón Herrera, Sub-Director of the Carabineros had sent another man as the link between Carabineros and Marambio.

Station told [redacted] that it would be glad to work out a plan to get the materials back securely.

[redacted] remarked that the assassination has drawn the Armed Forces much closer together, and that although many officers are still not happy over an Allende presidency, any plans to do anything at this time are finished.

Miranda refused to elaborate on this cryptic assertion.

been decided to recommend to the U.P. that the U.P. campaign committees, which were formed for the 1970 election, be revitalized and expanded. The PCCh will attempt to use the expanded membership of the U.P. committees as a base for recruiting new Party members.

President-elect Allende announced his new cabinet to the press yesterday afternoon.

In addition to efforts to recruit new members from among the U.P. committees, the PCCh also plans to review lists of former party members who were expelled or otherwise left the party to see whether such persons could be allowed to return to the PCCh.

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Interior - Jose Toha (Socialist)

Foreign Affairs - Clodomiro Almeyda (Socialist)

Economy - Pedro Fuskovic (Independent Marxist)

Finance - Americo Zorrilla (Communist)

Defense - Alejandro Rios (Radical)

Public Works - Pascual Barraza (Communist)

Labor - Jose Oyarce (Communist)

Agriculture - Jacques Chonchol (MAPU)

Housing - Carlos Cortes (Socialist)

Mines - Orlando Canturias (Radical)

Lands and Colonization - Humberto Martones (PSD)

Justice - Lisandro Cruz (API)

Health - Oscar Jimenez Pinochet (PSD)

Education - Mario Astorga (Radical)

Minister Secretary General of Government - Jaime Suarez
(Socialist)

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The Peruvian Investigations Police have issued an arrest order for Guillermo Carey Buslamante (Father of Guillermo Carey Jr.), Julio Eduardo Fontecilla Rojas and Arturo Escudero Tronlos.

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East Germany intends to shift the center of its economic activity from Brazil to Chile.

Finance Minister Zaldivar discussed with the Ambassador his plans to seek the Presidency of the PDC and subsequently become a candidate for the Senate seat vacated by Salvador Allende.

[REDACTED]

A leading member of the East German trade mission in Brazil has been selected to head the trade mission in Santiago.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Raul Saez, former Minister of Hacienda, has left Chile with his family to take up residence in Caracas where he will open an engineering consultant firm.

Ambassador Korry paid a farewell call on President Frei. Frei's personal plans include a brief rest and a two or three month foreign trip that starts with three lectures to the Council for Foreign Affairs in New York.

[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he does not intend to turn back the sub-machine guns and gas masks "because they still might come in handy later on". He assured [REDACTED] however, that the hardware was securely hidden.

[REDACTED] the assassination of General Schneider was the result of widespread plotting of Army officers. The plan was to kidnap Schneider but when Schneider resisted he was shot.

Saez believes the economy of Chile is deteriorating and will become the worst in Latin America. He expects the PCCh to take over completely.

Frei said that if it were necessary he would speak at the PDC 28 November junta which will select party leaders. Korry asked Frei if he was going to try to renew his party; Frei replied vigorously that he was going to fight.

COS was scheduled to meet with [REDACTED] last evening.

Salvador Allende took office as President of Chile yesterday.

The State ordered retired General Roberto Viaux held for court-martial on charges of participating in the October 22 slaying of General Schneider.

In an interview published yesterday in Excelsior, Mexico City's leading daily, President Allende said that the Chilean Constitution provided for plebiscites and he intends to use them if Congress rejects "the new forms" of government he plans.

Puro Chile and the Clarín are the only Chilean dailies which attempt to link the CIA to assassination of General Schneider. In the widely read Sunday supplement of the Clarín, columnist Hernan Rodriguez charges that the plotters received aid and technical assistance from other parts of the world.

COS met with [REDACTED] and reviewed events in the wake of the assassination of General Schneider. [REDACTED] confirmed that neither he nor [REDACTED] were involved in the assassination. [REDACTED]

Article adds accusation that Anaconda involved in campaign of terror during electoral campaign.

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US Assistant Secretary of State, Charles Meyer, met for 45 minutes yesterday with President Allende. Allende stated that Chile would never be used to harm the security interests of the hemisphere and that no foreign military bases would be established in Chile.

An official GOC announcement stated that retired General Roberto Viaux, and his father-in-law, retired Army Col. Raul Igault were charged by military prosecutor Fernando Lyon with conspiracy in the killing of General Schneider.

Prensa Latina reported that a terrorist plot to attack President Allende and outgoing President Frei was detected on the eve of the inauguration and that at least one of the plotters was arrested on 3 November.

The Associated Press reported that one of Allende's first actions was to appoint a Socialist, a Communist and a non-Marxist Radical party member to be governors of Chile's three most important provinces.

[REDACTED]

MAPU Congress ending 1 November resulted in the election of Rodrigo Ambrosio, leader of the left wing of MAPU.

Allende added that he wished to maintain good relations with the US and that any socio-economic changes would be carried out within the law.

The FBIS also reported that Julio Eduardo Fontecilla, a principal suspect in the assassination of General Schneider, was arrested yesterday in Lima, Peru.

The Peruvian Investigative Police stated that a member of Interpol will arrive in Lima today to assist in the interrogation and negotiation for the transfer of the prisoner to Chile. The police said Fontecilla will be presented to the Peruvian and Foreign press within the next few hours.

The terrorists were reportedly planning to run toward Frei's and Allende's car carrying explosives which they would explode at the risk of their own lives.

The Socialist will head six of the 25 provinces including Santiago. The Communists will get another six, including Valparaiso, Chile's second largest city. Six Radicals will get governorships including Concepcion. The other seven governorships will be divided between the smaller parties that make up the Allende coalition.

[REDACTED]

Ambrosio apparently intends to bind MAPU closer to Marxist members of the UP

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On 3 November Allende appointed Admiral Montero, a known critic of the U.S., as Navy CINC. General Ruiz, politically leftist-oriented, is considered a strong supporter of Allende. General Jose Maria Sepulveda was appointed Carabinero Director replacing General Huerta and General Prats was confirmed as Army CINC.

On 4 November the GOC lifted the national state of emergency.

Spanish police reported on 2 November that they had arrested Julio Izquierdo Menendez, one of the alleged assailants of General Schneider.

Yesterday President Allende, making his first political speech since taking office Tuesday, said that his government would create a "republic of the working class" in Chile.

The arrest was based on information supplied by the Chilean police and transmitted by Interpol.

Allende added that there would be violence in Chile only if the "egotistical forces of the right" sought to resist the mandate his left wing coalition had received at the polls.

[REDACTED]

Investigation Director Gen. Cheyre said that Chilean Supreme Court would be asked to prepare extradition requests for Julio Fontecilla in Lima and Julio Izquierdo Menendez in Madrid.

PDC Daily La Prensa yesterday carried an exclusive interview with Major Marshall who reportedly said he had washed his hands of the affair prior to the "stupid" assault on Schneider. He fingered Viaux as the guiding spirit behind the assassination.

Ex-President Frei told Assistant Secretary Meyer and Ambassador Korry that Allende has made an unequivocal offer of Ambassadorship to the U.S. to Hernan Santo Cruz Barcelo.

[REDACTED]

Spanish Foreign Ministry officer foresees difficulty in extradition of Izquierdo since present extradition treaty existing between Spain and Chile does not include political crimes.

Marshall added that he believed that the CIA had nothing to do with the Schneider plot.

Santo Cruz is presently Chilean Ambassador to International Organizations in Geneva.

[REDACTED]

A member of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) met with the PCCh to exchange information concerning the UP coalition.

The leaders of the PCCh have decided to convoke a National Party Conference in mid-November 1970 to formulate new PCCh policies and to establish guidelines for those PCCh representatives who have been selected to participate in the new government.

During the week of 20 October 1970, students at the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN), the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), and the Jose Marti Cuban Cultural Institute circulated rumors to the effect that a Congress of the Latin American Continental Student Organization (OCLAE) will be held in Santiago some time in 1971.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Track II [REDACTED] terminated as of 0800 hours 9 November.

The PCC expects that some aspects of the UP experience can be applied in Colombia. The PCC has taken preliminary steps to create a "National Committee for the Defense and Autonomy of the Chilean Government" which will become operative in January 1971.

The conference will also be utilized to formulate PCCh strategy for the 1971 municipal elections.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

President Allende presided at his first cabinet meeting yesterday to plan steps to counter economic disturbances triggered by his election.

Ho Si Ngoi, leader of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Allende inauguration, yesterday told Latin Press Agency that North Vietnam trade with Chile could be based on the import of Chilean copper in exchange for North Vietnamese coal, farm machinery, and handwork.

Diplomats stationed in La Paz, Bolivia, have reportedly contacted high-ranking military authorities in Bolivia in an effort to obtain the release of Regis Debray.

The state of Allende's health is once again a topic of private discussion in Chilean political circles. It was widely believed in May of this year that Allende had suffered a coronary condition.

Ex-President Frei is actively politicking within the PDC in anticipation of the PDC November 28-29 National Junta. Frei hopes to have junta install PDC leadership which will buttress his attempt to construct broad national coalition in "constructive" opposition to Allende.

The immediate economic goals of the six day old Allende government are to curb the rising cost of living (34.1%) and alleviate the 7% inflation rate.

Ngoi, who is Secretary General of the Vietnam General Federation of Trade Unions, said that Vietnam is ready to establish diplomatic and trade relations with Chile but added that this depends mainly on the Chilean Government's willingness.

It is also believed that if Debray is released he will seek asylum in Chile. Chilean Government circles have announced that the government had no information concerning these reports.

President Allende's extra-marital and drinking activities also continue to titillate local observers.

In making his bid for control of the PDC, Frei apparently has not yet settled on a party presidential candidate, although he seems to be leaning toward ex-Finance Minister Andres Zaldivar or Senator Patricio Aylwin.

[REDACTED]

In a conversation on 6 November with leaders of the PS, Aniceto Rodriguez (PS Secretary General) voiced his bitter disappointment over the failure of his bid to be named Minister of the Interior of Allende's Government. Rodriguez openly displayed his discontent by refusing to attend any of the inauguration ceremonies.

Rodriguez said that he plans to convoke a PS National Congress in December 1970, at which time he will attempt to remove many of the leaders of the extreme wing of the party from positions of influence.

Allende government has begun negotiation to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. It was understood that the negotiations have been undertaken with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.

Chile's new socialist government intends to disband the riot police force and to quash sedition charges against the MIR.

10 November issue of Punto Final carried 10 page expose of Schneider assassination. Article states that evidently the real brains behind the assassination was the CIA and that General Viaux, Pablo Rodriguez and the Patria y Libertad organization operated at the secondary level in the conspiracy. Article also ties in General Vicente Huerta and three high ranking military officers directly with the plotters.

Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Chief of the Latin American, Asian and African sections of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated privately in early November 1970 that diplomatic relations with Chile will be resumed in the very near future. He predicted that these diplomatic relations will be augmented by cultural, political, economic and social changes.

On 5 November "Ya," local daily extremist and opposition newspaper, published a story dealing with statements reportedly made by Bolivian Army Commander Luis Requeterena regarding a possible exchange of Regis Debray for Huber Mattos.

Augustin Edwards and his mother reportedly will resign from El Mercurio board effective 10 November. Edwards' brother will also resign but Sonia, with 10% ownership in the Company, will remain.

The sources, who would not agree to be identified, said that Chile hoped to settle the question of her relations with Cuba before Rodriguez left for Cuba but no date for a formal announcement had been set.

The government said the riot police would be absorbed into regular national police units.

While it is likely that the MIR did penetrate Viaux's group,

Lechuga Hevia noted that the Chilean Army respected the Constitution and was not likely to stage a coup against the Allende government.

Article also commented that La Paz press circles do not discard the possibility that Claude Fly might be released in exchange for Debray.

New board will include Hernan Cubillos, Benjamin Saavedra, and Santiago Lyon.